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The use of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions has increased signifi-
cantly. The number of crime laboratories has tripled in the last two decades. 1 New 
scientific procedures are introduced in evidence every year. Neutron activation 
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analysis, 2 atomic absorption, 3 scanning electron microscopy, 4 and trace metal 
detection5 are but a fevv of the tccl-miques now used in criminal prosecutions. 6 A survey 
oflawyers and judges revealed that " [ t]hree quarters of the responders indicated about 
1/3 of their cases,utilized scientific evidence." 7 More important, however, is the 
impact of this type of evidence. One study, which surveyed jury attitudes, observed: 
''About one quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with 
scientific evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have 
changed their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty.'' 8 
Frequently, the most expedient :way to introduce scientific evidence at trial is 
through the admission of a laboratory report. 9 The results of drug analyses, 10 
fingerprint examinations, 11 intoxication tests, 12 rape victim examinations, 13 and 
va.rious other scientific techniques 14 have been admitied in this fashion. Similarly, 
2. E.g., United States v. Stifel, .J33 F.2d 431,435-41 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State 
v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403,419-22,260 A.2d 547,549-61 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See 
generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence ofNelllron Acti!'ation Analysis, 50 A.L.R.3d 117 (1973); Comment, The 
Evidemiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 997 (1971). 
3. E.g., Chatom v. State, 3-18 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1977); State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35,38-40,383 
A.2d 440,441-42 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 326-28, 255 S.E.2d 373, 381-82 (1979); State v. 
McCall, 698 S.\V.2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. !985). See generally Watkins & Watkins, Identification of Substances 
by lnstrwnemal Analysis, in 22 AM. JuR. PRoOF OF FACTS 385, 476-87 (1969). 
4. E.g., People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978). See generally Judd, Scanning 
Electron ft1icroscopy as Applied to Forensic Evidence Analysis, in PRACf!SING LAW INsTITUTE, ScrENTif-lC AND ExPERT 
EviDENcE 873 (2d ed. 1981). 
5. E.g., Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 558-60, 372 N.E.2d 1149, 1151-52 (1978); State v. Snyder, 190 N.J. 
Super. 6~6, 631-33, 464 A.2d 1209, 121 l-12 (Law Div. 1983); State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4, 5-6, 305 N.E.2d 
497, 498 (1973); Brotherton v. State, 666 S.\V.2d 126, 129-30 (Tex. App. 1983). See generally Stevens & Messler, 
Trace Metal Detection Technique, in PRACTISING LAW INSTmJTE, SciENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 1075 (2d ed. 1981). 
6. See gazeral/y Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century 
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. l I 97 (1980). 
7. 0. SCHROEDER, A LEGAL STUDY CoNCERNtNG THE FoRENsic SCIENCES PERSONNEL 19 (Assessment of the Forensic 
Sciences Profession val. 3, March 1977). 
8. Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note l, at 1748. 
9. "Directors of crime laboratories estimate that their examiners testify in court in less than l 0% of the cases they 
examine. Consequently, it is principally the reports themselves which convey scientific information to various users in the 
criminal justice system." !d. 
10. E.g., United States v. Frattini, 50! F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (lab report identifying substance as 
cocaine); United States v. Parlcer, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973) (lab report identifying substance as heroin), cerr. 
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (197-l); United Srates v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698,699 (7th Cir. 1957) (lab report identifying substance 
as heroin). Bw sa State v. Russell, l 14 N.H. 222, 224-25, 317 A.2d 781, 7R2 (1974) (lab report identifying substance 
as marijuana excluded under federal and state constitution); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (lab 
report identifying substances as LSD and marijuana excluded on constitutional grounds). 
ll. See United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232, 238-39, 15 C.fvl.R. 232, 238-39 (1954). 
12. E.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476,480 (4th Cir. 1Y5g) (certificate of blood alcohol test), cert. denied, 
358 U.S. 825 (1958); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392,397,297 A,2d 223,226 (1972) (report of breathalyzer test); 
State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 381, 323 S.E.2d 3 I 6, 318 (1984) (affidavit of breath tests results). Bw see Moon v. State, 
300 Md. 354, 368-73, 478 A.2d 695, 702-04 (1984) (admission of hospital report of blood alcohol test violated right 
of confrontation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985). 
13. E.g., Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying sperm on 
vaginal smear); United States e.t rei. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (hospital record of rape 
victim examination); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900, 900 (W.D. Va. 1970) (lab report identifying seminal fluid); 
Henson v. State. 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. I 975) (hospital record of rape victim examination); Commonwealth v. Franks, 
359 Mass. 577, 580-81, 270 N.E.2d 837, 839-40 (1971) (hospital report identifying sperm). But see Piclcett v. Bowen, 
798 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (I lth Cir. 1986) (medical report of sex abuse victim examination excluded on constitutional 
grounds). 
14. E.g., Hardy v. State, 53 Ala. App. 75, 78,297 So. 2d 399, 402 (1974) (fireanns identification report); State 
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pathological findings have been introduced through autopsy reports. 15 Some of these 
reports have been prepared by public agencies, such as police crime laboratories and 
medical examiner offices. 16 Others have been prepared by private hospitals.I7 In 
some cases, laboratory reports have been used to establish ultimate issues, such as the 
identity of a controlled substance in a drug prosecution. 18 
The adrnissiblity of scientific reports raises a number of evidentiary issues. 
Sometimes the report is used in conjunction with expert testimony, either to refresh 
recollectioni9 or as recorded recollection. 20 In either case, the expert is present in 
court and subject to cross-examination on such matters as his qualifications, the 
procedures employed, and the meaning of any conclusions reached. When the report 
is used as a substitute for expert testimony, however, cross-examination is foreclosed 
and important hearsay and confrontation issues are raised.2I 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules) in 1975, 
most federal courts admitted laboratory reports under either the public22 or business 
records23 exceptions to the hearsay rule. State cases were in accord. 24 In addition, 
v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972) (lab report of examination of burglary debris); In re Nelson, 83 Misc. 2d 
1081, 1083-84,374 N.Y.S.2d 982,984-86 (Fam. Ct. 1975) ("ballistics" report); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 
121, 542 P.2d 782, 788 (1975) (lab report of blood test). 
15. E.g., Grover v. State, 41 Md. App. 705, 710-11, 398 A.2d 528, 531 (1979); Burleson v. State, 585 S.W.2d 
711, 712-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Bur see Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 315-17, 322 A.2d 653, 657 
(1974) (autopsy report excluded under state constitution). 
16. E.g., United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973) (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs laboratory), cerr. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698,699 (7th Cir. 1957) (Bureau 
of Narcotics laboratory); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900 (W.O. Va. 1970) (medical examiner's office). 
17. E.g., Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981,982 (3d Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying sperm on 
vaginal smear); United States ex rei. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E. D. Pa. 1974) (hospital record of rape 
victim examination); Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination). 
18. See cases cited supra note 10. 
19. E.g., United States v. Franklin, 747 F.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1984) (chemists refreshed recollection prior to trial 
by reviewing reports prepared at the time cocaine tested). In this situation, however, the analyst's in-court testim~ny and 
not the laboratory report is the evidence. The report may be introduced in evidence only by the adverse party and then 
only for impeachment. See FED. R. Evm. 612. ' 
20. E.g., United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1976) (report identifying substance as 
cocaine admitted where chemist testified that he had analyzed the substance and correctly prepared the report but had no 
independent recollection of the tests). See FED. R. Evm. 803(5). 
21. The admissibility of lab reports raises additional evidentiary issues. Because most laboratory reports in criminal 
cases are prepared by government laboratories, they qualify as self-authenticating documents and thus may be admitted 
without extrinsic evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 902; United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1982) ("A 
laboratory report may also be admitted as an official record when it is accompanied by an authenticating certificate."). 
The original writing ("best evidence") rule requires the production of the original document in order to prove the 
content of a writing. FED. R. Evm. 1002. An exception, however, is typically recognized for public records, under which 
certified copies of public records are admissible. FED. R. Evm. 1005. See also People v. Brown, 128 Misc. 2d 149, 152, 
488 N.Y.S.2d 559, 563 (Co. Ct. 1985) ("Properly certified or authenticated copies of the test results are ... admissible 
as copies of official records .... "). 
22. E.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1958) (certificate of blood alcohol test), cerr. 
denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958). See generally lmwinkelried, The Consrirurionaliry of lnrroducing Evaluative Laboratory 
Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1979). 
23. E.g., United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (lab report identifying substance as 
cocaine); United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973) (lab report identifying substance as heroin), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying 
sperm on vaginal smear); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 1957) (lab report identifying substance as 
heroin). 
24. E.g., Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773,775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination admitted 
as a business record); State v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972) (lab report of examination of burglary debris 
admitted as business record); State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 229, 541 P.2d 1204, 1209 (1975) (lab report identifying 
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many courts had rejected confrontation challenges. 25 The advent of the Federal Rules 
and their adoption by numerous states,26 however, has cast doubt on the earlier cases. 
For example, a leading case, United States v. Oates, 27 held a DEA chemist's report 
inadmissible under the Federal Rules.2s Moreover, the confrontation issue remains 
clouded. As an American Bar Association study has noted, the constitutionality of 
admitting "certain scientific reports in criminal cases" is an issue left open by the 
Federal Rules. 29 The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue,30 and the Court's 
recent confrontation cases do not pomt to a clear answer. The lower courts are 
divided. 31 
This Article examines the issues raised by the admissibility of prosecution 
laboratory reports in lieu of expert testimony. Part ll discusses the problems that arise 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part ill considers the constitutional question. 
substance as marijuana admitted as public record); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 395,297 A.2d 223, 225 (1972) 
(report ofbreathalyzer test admitted as public record); In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 519, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1001 
(Fam. Ct. 1975) (lab report identifying substance as heroin admitted as public and business records); People v. Porter, 
46 A.D.2d 307, 311, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1974) (lab report of blood-alcohol test admitted as business record); State 
v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 114-16, 542 P.2d 782, 784-85 (1975) (lab report of blood examination admitted as business 
record). 
Bw see State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 224, 317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as marijuana 
does not qualify as a business record). 
25. E.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1958) (certificate of blood alcohol test), cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958); United States ex rei. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Pa. !974) (hospital 
record of rape victim examination); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900, 900 (W.O. Va. 1970) (lab report identifying 
seminal fluid); Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination); 
Commonwealth v. Franks, 359 Mass. 577,580-81,270 N.E.2d 837,839-40 (1971) (hospital report identifying sperm); 
Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 461-62, 253 N.E.2d 346, 351-52 (1969) (lab report identifying substance 
as marijuana); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 397, 297 A.2d 223, 226 (1972) (report of breathalyzer test results); In 
re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517,521-24,363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004-07 (Fam. Ct. 1975) (lab report identifying substance 
as heroin); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 62, 65, 175 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1970) (lab report identifying seminal 
fluid); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 121, 542 P.2d 782, 788 (1975) (lab report of blood test). 
But see State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 224-25, 317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as 
marijuana excluded under federal and state constitution); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 315-17, 322 A.2d 
653, 657 (1974) (autopsy report excluded under state constitution). 
26. Thirty-three jurisdictions have adopted rules of evidence patterned after the Federal Rules. See I J. WEINSTEIN 
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EviDENCE T-1 (1986). 
27. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). 
28. ld. at 84. 
29. Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules af Evidence, 1983 A.B.A. SEc. Lrr. REP. 7. 
30. In an early case, Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), the Court in dictum stated that an autopsy report 
"could not have been admitted without the consent of the accused ... because the accused was entitled to meet the 
witnesses face to face." /d. at450. 
31. Courts finding a confrontation violation include: Pickett v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (lith Cir. 1986) 
(medical report of sex abuse victim examination); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1290-92 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(reports on the value of gems); Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1984) (death certificate); Stewart 
v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 85 (6th Cir. 1976) ("ballistics" report); Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 368-73, 478 A.2d 695, 
702-05 (1984)(hospital report of blood alcohol test); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (lab report 
identifying substances as LSD and marijuana). 
Courts rejecting a confrontation challenge include: United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69,72 (C.M.A. 1980) (lab report 
identifying substance as marijuana); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 838 (D.C. App. 1984) (lab report 
identifying substance as heroin); Groverv. State, 41 Md. App. 705,710-11,398 A.2d 528, 53! (1979) (autopsy report); 
State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 381, 323 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1984) (affidavit of breath analysis test results); Burleson v. 
State, 585 S.W.2d 711,712-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (autopsy report). 
The courts have consistently excluded psychiatric reports on confrontation grounds. See Kienlen v. United States, 
437 F.2d 843, 848-49 (lOth Cir. 1971); Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337,348 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 
(1972); People v. Johnson, II Ill. App. 3d 395,401-02, 296 N.E.2d 763,768 (1973); Gregory v. State, 40 Md. App. 
297, 325, 391 A.2d 437,454 (1978). 
1988] ADMISSIBILIIT OF LABORATORY REPORTS 675 
The principal focus of the Article is on reports prepared by police crime laboratories, 
the type of report most commonly encountered in criminal prosecutions. 
No matter how the issue is framed, the reliability of the report is the central 
concern. The hearsay issue initially involves an inquiry into Congress' intent in 
enacting the public and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. As applied to 
laboratory reports, however, this intent is unclear. Thus, traditional analysis, which 
focuses on the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, must be considered. 
Similarly, the constitutional analysis turns on the reliability of these reports as well 
as on the right of face-to-face confrontation. This Article concludes that reliability 
concerns should preclude the admission of laboratory reports when offered by the 
prosecution but proposes a procedure in Part IV by which these reports may be 
admitted consistent with constitutional values. 
II. FEDERAL RuLEs OF EviDENCE 
Federal Rule 803(8),32 which codifies the public records exception to the 
hearsay rule, has been the principal obsta~le to the admissibility of laboratory reports 
in federal trials. The public records exception is supported by several rationales. 
First, because of "the assumption that a public official will perform his duty 
properly, "33 public records are considered reliable. Second, "the unlikelihood that 
[the--official] will remember details independently of the record' ' 34 makes reliance on 
the record a necessity in many cases. 
Although rule 803(8) was intended to facilitate the use of public records, its 
application in criminal cases has spawned a number of problems. Initially, the 
classification of different kinds of public records can sometimes be troublesome. The 
rule recognizes three types of public records: (A) records relating to the activities of 
the office, (B) records involving matters observed pursuant to a duty, and (C) 
investigative reports. 35 The distinctions between these subdivisions are not precise36 
and thus there may be an "overlap. " 37 Because the limitations on admissibility differ 
depending on the type of public record involved, it is sometimes critical to determine 
which subdivision of the rule applies. 38 Courts have considered both subdivision (B) 
and subdivision (C) when ruling on the admissibility of laboratory reports. 
32. FED. R. Evrn. 803(8) provides: 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) 
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to wlrich 
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
33. FED. R. Evrn. 803(8) advisory committee note. 
34. /d. 
35. See supra note 32. 
36. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 724 (1980) ("[T]he three clauses simply do not create 
watertight compartments."). 
37. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]here may be no sharp demarcation between the 
records covered by exception 8(B) and those referenced in exception 8(C), ... and indeed there may in some cases be 
actual overlap .... "). 
38. For example, classifying a record as a subdivision (A) record bypasses the criminal trial limitations codified 
in subdivisions (B) and (C). See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 877 n.l6 (2d ed. 1986) ("Instead of 
attempting to place such a limitation upon Rule 803(8)(B), it is suggested that records of routine activities, not related to 
676 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:671 
A. Investigative Reports 
Rule 803(8)(C) encompasses public records containing ''factual findings result-
ing from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.' ' 39 The federal 
drafters referred to such records as "evaluative reports. "40 In a leading case, United 
States v. Oates,41 the Second Circuit stated that it "seems indisputable to us that the 
chemist's official report and worksheet [identifying a substance as heroin] ... can be 
characterized as [investigative] reports .... ''42 As the rule explicitly provides, 
investigative reports are not admissible in criminal cases when offered against the 
accused; they are, however, admissible if offered against the prosecution. 43 Accord-
ing to the federal drafters, this result is required "in view of the almost certain 
collision with confrontation rights which would result from their use against the 
accused in a criminal case. "44 
If accepted, the Oates position would be dispositive: Congress presumably 
agreed with the confrontation analy~is offered by the drafters, and laboratory reports, 
as investigative reports, are therefore inadmissible. Oates, however, has been both 
distinguished and criticized. Distinguishing Oates, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
in State v. Manke45 held a laboratory report admissible under its version of rule 
803(8)(C) where the analyst was present in court and subject to cross-examination. 46 
In such a case, the court reasoned, confrontation rights are protected, and thus the 
rationale for the limitation in criminal cases is inapplicable.47 Since the chemist in 
Oates was not present at trial,48 Manke is not necessarily inconsistent. More 
importantly, the court's analysis is sound; the opportunity to cross-examine the expert 
attrial eliminates the constitutional issue. 
A far more serious challenge to Oates is based on a different reading of the 
legislative history. In discussing Oates, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger have 
written: 
No legislative history indicates a Congressional intention to bar the admissibility of those 
records which prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules had been admitted pursuant to the 
business records exception. The Advisory Committee's intention was not to restrict 
admissibility .... 49 
a specific investigation, like the recording of serial numbers, are properly included with Rule 803(A) as activities of the 
office." (citations o'mitted)). 
39. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C). 
40. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee note. 
41. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). 
42. /d. at 67. See also Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 54-55 
(2d Cir. 1986) (fingerprint and handwriting reports admissible under rule 803(8)(C) in a civil case). 
43. See generally Annotation, Admissibility Under Rule 803(8)(C) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of "Factual 
Findings Resulting from Investigations Made Pursua/1/ to Authority Granted by Law", 47 A.L.R. FED. 321 (1980). 
44. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee note. 
45. 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982) (lab analyses of pillow and bed sheets in sex abuse prosecution). 
46. /d. at 802-05. 
47. /d. 
48. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1977). 
49. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 803-264 (1987). 
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As noted earlier, the prior federal cases generally had admitted laboratory reports. so 
Although the court in Oates believed that the prior cases were not dispositive, 51 the 
issue remains debatable because laboratory reports were never mentioned in the 
legislative history. 52 
The conflict between Oates and the prior cases, however, may involve more 
than an issue of congressional intent. The Oates court obviously viewed the 
underlying chemical procedure as an "evaluative" process. In contrast, one of the 
leading pre-Federal Rules cases viewed a blood alcohol test as involving "an 
objective fact, not a mere expression of opinion. " 53 This latter characterization 
suggests that rule 803(8)(C) may not apply; the rule governs only investigative or 
evaluative reports, not the simple recording of objective facts. Hence, an appreciation 
of the scientific procedure is as important as an understanding of the legal issues. 
Indeed, as will be developed later in this Article, the scientific issue is the 
determinative issue. 
B. Matters Observed Pursuant to Duty: The Police Records Exclusion 
Courts have also considered the admissibility of laboratory reports under rule 
803(8)(B) - reports of matters observed and recorded pursuant to a legal duty. For 
example, the court in Oates concluded that laboratory reports "might also be within 
the ambit" of this provision, 54 a ruling that required the court to examine rule 
803(8)(B)'s explicit exclusion of police records: "[I]n criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel'' are inadmissible. 55 
The police records exclusion did not appear in the rule as promulgated by the 
Supreme Court.56 It was added by amendment from the floor of the House of 
Representatives. 57 Several aspects of the legislative history are noteworthy. First, 
confrontation concerns played a prominent role in the floor debates. The sponsor of 
50. See cases cited supra notes 22-23. 
51. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 74 n.31 (2d Cir. 1977) (Prior cases were decided before enactment of 
Federal Rules and "before the recent wave of cases broadening the interpretation of the confrontation clause .... "). 
52. See Alexander, The Hearsay Exception for Public Records in Federal Criminal Trials, 47 ALBANY L. REv. 699, 
720 (1983) ("The problem with [the Oates] interpretation of rule 803(C) ... is that prior to adoption of the Federal Rule, 
federal courts approved the admissibility of certain types of laboratory reports under the business records exception." 
(footnote omitted)). 
53. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958). 
54. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 65 (2d Cir. 1977). 
55. See generally Annotation, CoiL'itruction and Application of Provision of Rule 803(8)(B), Federal Rules of 
Evidence, Excluding from Exception to Hearsay Rule in Criminal Cases Matters Observed by Law Enforcement Officers, 
37 A.L.R. FEn. 831 (1978). 
56. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 301 (1973). 
57. One problem caused by the amendments involves the admissibility of police records offered by the defense. On 
its face, rule 803(8)(8) would appear to exclude all police records, whether offered by the prosecution or the defense. In 
this respect, subdivision (B) differs from subdivision (C), which expressly excludes investigative reports in criminal cases 
only when offered by the prosecution. In United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the D.C. Circuit 
addressed this issue: "[T]he apparently absolute language of 803(8)(8) had its origin in congressional concern that use 
of reports against defendants would be unfair." /d. at 969 n.24. Accordingly, "803(8)(8) should be read, in accordance 
with the obvious intent of Congress and in harmony with 803(8)(C) to authorize the admission of the reports of police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel at the request of the defendant in a criminal case.'' /d. at 968 n.24. 
See also OHlo Evm. R. 803(8)(8) (explicitly exempting reports "offered by the defendant" from the police records 
exclusion); State v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986, 996-97 (Me. 1984) (police lab report offered by defendant admissible as 
business record). 
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the amendment, Representative Dennis, stated: "I think in a criminal case you ought 
to have to call the policeman on the beat and give the defendant the chance to cross 
examine him, rather than just reading the report into evidence. That is the purpose of 
this amendment. " 58 Representative Holtzman believed the amendment "reaffirms 
the right of cross examination,'' a right that ''guarantees due process of law and a fair 
trial. "59 Similarly, Representative Johnson commented that without the amendment, 
the Supreme Court would declare the rule "unconstitutional. " 60 Second, the 
legislative history also indicates concern about the reliability of police reports. For 
example, the Senate Committee Report contains the following comment on the 
amendment: 
Ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene 
of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public 
officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the 
police and the defendant in criminal cases.6 1 
In other words, the police officers' role in the "often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime" 62 undercuts the reliability of their reports. This is a somewhat 
different concern than the one raised in the House debates, which seemed to 
emphasize the right to face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination, notwith-
standing the reliability of a report. 63 
The congressional concerns about confrontation and reliability, however, 
focused on one particular type of police report-a report by a ''police officer,'' an 
"investigator," or as expressed by the amendment's sponsor, a "policeman on the 
beat. " 64 The example used in the House debates involved an officer who "made a 
report that he saw Mr. X with a gun on such and such an occasion .... " 65 This 
emphasis on crime scene investigations that entail adversarial confrontations with the 
accused has led to divergent interpretations of Congress' intent in enacting the police 
records exclusion. 
58. 120 CoNG. REc. 2387 (1974). 
59. Jd. at 2388. 
60. Jd. 
61. S. P-EP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2<.1 Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7064. 
62. The quoted phrase comes from a Supreme Court decision contrasting the function of a neutral and detached 
magistrate with that of a policeman in determining probable cause. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
63. The reliability of police reports did not seem to be a concern of Representative Dennis, the sponsor of the 
amendment. Representative Smith argued against the amendment because he believed it made police officers 
"second-class citizens and persons less trustworthy than social workers or garbage coUectors." 120 CoNa. REc. 2388 
(1974). Representative Dennis disagreed: 
/d. 
I would like to say on that point that of course is not my idea. 1 think the point is that we are dealing here with 
criminal cases, and in a criminal case the defendant should be confronted with the accuser to give him the chance 
to cross-examine. This is not any reflection on the police officer .... 
64. 120 CoNG. REc. 2387 (1974). 
65. /d. at 2388 (remarks of Representative Brasco). 
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1. Routine Records 
In Oates the Second Circuit adopted a literal interpretation of the police records 
exclusion, under which all police reports are inadmissible. 66 According to the court, 
prosecution laboratory reports fell within the exclusion. 67 In contrast, other courts 
have adopted a more flexible approach, holding that the exclusion does not apply to 
all police records. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that ''Congress did not 
intend to exclude [police] records of routine, nonadversarial matters .... " 68 The 
court focused on the Senate Committee Report's language concerning the "adver-
sarial nature of the confrontation'' between the police and the defendant ''at the scene 
of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant. " 69 One court accepting this view 
has stated: 
In the case of documents recording routine, objective observations, made as part of the 
everyday function of the preparing official or agency, the factors likely to cloud the 
perception of an official engaged in the more traditional law enforcement functions of 
observation and investigation of crime are simply not present. Due to the lack of any 
motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than mechanically register an 
unambiguous factual matter ... , such records are, like other public documents, inherently 
reliable. 70 
Under this approach courts have admitted police reports contammg the routine 
recording of license plate 71 and serial numbers, 72 chain of custody documents, 73 
warrants of deportation,74 a marshall's return on service of an injunction,75 and 
breathalyzer calibration certificates. 76 
If laboratory analyses are considered routine and objective, they are admissible 
under this approach. 77 According to one ~ourt, a chemist "does no more than seek to 
establish an intrinsically neutral fact. . . . " 78 Another has stated that reports of 
chemical analyses "contain[] objective facts rather than expressions of opinion. " 79 
Thus, one commentator has written: 
66. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 (2d Cir. 1977). 
67. /d. at 78-80. 
68. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979). 
69. /d. (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17). 
70. United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 
71. United States v. Puente, 826 F.2d 1415, 1418 (5th Cir. 1987) (customs officer's recording of license plate 
numbers admissible); United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir.) (customs officer's recording of license 
plate numbers admissible), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979). 
72. United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (routine recording of serial numbers of firearms 
unrelated to commission of crime admissible). 
73. United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 910-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
74. United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hernandez-Rajas, 617 F.2d 
533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980). 
75. United States v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 391 (lst Cir. 1978). 
76. United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1626 (1987). 
See also United States v. Gilbert, 774 F.2d 962, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1985) (notations on fingerprint card admissible 
as routine, nonadversarial record). 
77. E.g., State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361,381,323 S.E.2d 316,327 (1984) (rejecting Oates and admitting report 
of breath analysis tests). See also State v. Smith, 66 Or. App. 703,707,675 P.2d 510,512 (1984) (distinguishing Oates 
and admitting certificate of breathalyzer inspections). 
78. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 582, 45 C.M.R. 353, 356 (1972) (LSD analysis). 
79. Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C. App. 1984). See also Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 
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[A] routine report which merely identifies a substance or describes its objective character-
istics, such as a report which states Lhat a specimen is cocaine, or that a vaginal swab 
contains seminal fluid, or that a blood sample contains .15% alcohol, should qualify for 
admission under [rule 803(8)] if the tests upon which such a report is based are ministerial 
in nature, requiring the analyst to do little more than record the results of a mathematical 
computation or the reading of a dial. so 
The characterization of laboratory procedures as routine and objective is not without 
problems. As noted by one court, a laboratory report identifying a substance as 
marijuana is "not concerned with routine observations of acts, conditions or events 
observed or recorded by presumably neutral public officials. " 81 Rather, it involves 
"the examination and evaluation of crucial evidence against a defendant made after 
the commencement of a criminal prosecution and for use in that prosecution.' ' 82 Here 
again, the legal issue turns on an understanding of the scientific procedures 
involved-whether these procedures are "routine and objective" or "evaluative." 
2. Other Law Enforcement Personnel 
A related issue involves the meaning of the term "other law enforcement 
personnel.'' The police records exclusion applies only to reports prepared by ''police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel. " 83 In Oates the court held that 
chemists employed by the U.S. Customs Service were "law enforcement 
personnel. " 84 According to the court, "any officer or employee of a governmental 
agency which has law enforcement responsibilities" is covered by that term, and 
"[c]hemists at the laboratory are, without question, important participants in the 
prosecutmial effort." 85 
Because the legislative history provides no elaboration of the term ''other Jaw 
enforcement personnel," room for disagreement with the Oates' interpretation 
remains. 86 Indeed, the Oates court labelled the issue a "difficult question. " 87 As 
previously noted, in adopting the police records exclusion, Congress focused on the 
481 (4th Cir.) (Certificate of blood alcohol test results involves "an objective fact, not a mere expression of 
opinion. . . "), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958). 
80. 1\lexandcr, :supra note 52, ai 727-23 (fomnotc omitted). See also S. SALTZBUHG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLES 
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 837 (4th ed. 1986) ("But it is by no means clear that reports like those offered in !Oates]. laboratory 
reports conducted according to scientific principles utilized in experiments conducted day after day the same way in 
controlled circumstances, were meant to be included under the heading 'Police Reports.' "). 
81. State v. Matulewicz, 198 N.J. Super. 474, 477, 487 A.2d 772, 773 (App. Div. 1985) (emphasis added). 
82. !d. at 477, t!87 J\.2d at 773-74 (t:HI!Jbasis added). 
83. FED. R. Evm. 803(8). 
84. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977). 
85. /d. 
H6. Other courts have interpreted this phrase. See United States v. Puente, 826 F.2d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1987) 
("Customs Service officials are 'Jaw enforcement personnel' within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(B)."); United States v. 
Bohrer, 807 F.2d !59, 162 (lOth Cir. 1986) ("illS agents appear to be Jaw enforcement personnel. . . ");United States 
v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.) (customs inspector at border qualified as "Jaw enforcement personnel" under 
rule 803(8)(B)), cen. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir.) (city building 
inspectors not "Jaw enforcement personnel"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 
356 (2d Cir. 1978) (illS personnel who gather data and information routinely used in criminal prosecutions perform a Jaw 
enforcement function). 
87. United States v. Oates. 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir. !977). 
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'_'policeman on the beat," 88 and it may be that laboratory analysts should be treated 
differently. For example, one court has commented that a chemist does ''not have an 
interest in the outcome of trials.'' 89 Many criminalists share this view: ''The forensic 
scientist does not serve as an advocate for the plaintiff, prosecution, or defendant; he 
serves as an advocate for an opinion or conclusion based on objective physical 
evidence. "9° Accordingly, one commentator has concluded that laboratory analysts 
should not be considered "other law enforcement personnel": 
Congress was concerned with confrontation rights and the adversarial poslt.Ions of the 
defendant and the policeman "on the scene." This relation does not exist with a chemist or 
someone with similar duties. He does not face the defendant and is not on the streets .... 
The use of the phrase "other law enforcement personnel" should be restricted to actual 
Customs agents, FBI agents, and Treasury officials with police powers, such as the Secret 
Service. The mere fact that an individual works for a government agency that also has police 
personnel should not be a bar to his report corning into evidence, as the trustworthiness of 
his analytical tests (as in the case of the chemist) is simply not affected by the arrest 
confrontations that take place outside an office or a lab. 91 
There may be several problems with this view. First, many laboratory examiners 
are law enforcement officers and thus have "police powers. " 92 Second, the modern 
crime laboratory is an integral part of the law enforcement establishment. 93 ''Of the 
approximately 300 crime laboratories in the United States, over 80 percent are in 
police departments. "94 Moreover, most laboratories only examine evidence submit-
ted by the police or prosecution. A survey of 257 crime laboratories revealed that 
"[f]ifty-seven percent . . . would only examine evidence submitted by law 
enforcement officials. "95 For example, the services of the FBI laboratory are 
available without charge to all duly constituted state, county, and municipal law 
enforcement agencies in the United States.96 Consequently, the neutrality of the 
analyst can be questioned. 97 A few crime laboratories, however, do analyze items 
88. 120 CONG. REc. 2387 (1974). 
89. Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C. App. 1984). 
90. See Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659, 674 (1984). 
91. Grant, The Trustworthiness Standard for Public Records and Reports Hears cry Exception, 12 WEST. ST. U .L. 
REV. 53, 78 (1984). 
92. See NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMM'N ON CRIMINAL JusTICE STANDARDS AND GoALS, PoucE 303 (1974) ("There are 
... many police laboratories that have been staffed almost exclusively with sworn personnel."). 
93. See PREsiDENT's CoMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SociETY 255 (1967) ("The crime laboratory has been the oldest and strongest link between science and technology and 
criminal justice."). 
94. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 633 (1984) (remarks of Professor 
Joseph Peterson). See also Peterson, Mihajlovic & Bedrosian, The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's 
Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. FoRENSIC SCI. 10, II (1985) ("Seventy-nine percent of all laboratories responding to 
our survey are located within law enforcemenUpublic safety agencies."). 
95. /d. at 13 (emphasis in original). 
96. See FEDERAL BuREAU OF lNvESTJGATIDN, HANDBOOK OF FoRENSIC SciENCE 7 (Rev. ed. 1984). See also Williams, 
The FBI Laboratory-Its Availability and Use by Prosecutors from Investigation to Trial, 28 U. KAN. Crrv L. REv. 95, 
99 (1960). 
97. "Given what is known about reference group phenomena, the need that people have for social support of 
attitudes and conduct, and the process of socialization in occupational settings, it strains credulity to believe that these 
experts do not identify with prosecutors." M. SAKS & R. VAN DuJZEND, THE UsE OF SCIENTIFIC EviDENCE IN LmGATION 
53 (1983) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Also of some interest 
perhaps is a remark made by [the expert] which indicates that the Customs chemists do not mentally disassociate 
themselves from those who undoubtedly are law enforcement personnel."). 
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submitted by the defense, 98 and these may have a more plausible claim to neutrality. 
For example, in State v. J11anlce, 99 the court in admitti.1g a laboratory report observed: 
''There is nothing to indicate the laboratory report was made with any improper 
motive. Section 19-01-10 . places the State Laboratories Department at the 
disposal of the prosecution and the defense counsel; hence it is independent of both 
parties. " 100 
Nonetheless, framing the issue in this way obscures the critical concern. While 
the analyst may not be absolutely neutral, he is further removed from the scene than 
the policeman on the beat, and thus the pressures to slant evidence are far less in most 
cases. Even if this observation is correct, however, it tells us nothing about the 
analyst's qualifications, the validity of his procedures, or the accuracy of his 
conclusions. 101 Bias may be a problem, but it is not the main problem. 
C. Business Records Exception 
Prosecution laboratory reports may also be admissible as business records .102 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, the admissibility of these reports as 
business records raised two issues: (1) whether the results reported were properly 
considered inadmissible opinions, as opposed to facts, and (2) whether the reports 
were excludable because they were prepared in anticipation ofprosecution. 103 Federal 
Rule 803(6), 104 which governs the business records exception, settles the first issue 
by expressly providing for the admissibility of "opinions" and "diagnoses." 
98. E.g., N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 19-0!-10 (Supp. 1987); VA. ConE ANN.§ 2.1-433 (1987); WJs. STAT. ANN.§ 
165.79(1) (Wesl Supp. 1987). See generally Note, E<ploring the Limits of Brady v. Maryland: Criminal Discovery as a 
Due Process Right in Access to Police Investigations and State Crime Laboratories, !5 U. RICH. L REv. !89, 208-10 
(1980). 
99. 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982). 
100. !d. at 803. Even in this context, the neutrality of the analyst has been questioned: 
Control of the forensic science laboratory in Virginia was transferred about II years ago from the Department 
of Public Safety. where it functioned as a police laboratory, to the Department of General Services, where it 
operates as part of the consolidated laboratory system of the state. I assure you that this was a change in name 
only and not in attitude of the personnel. Prosecuting attorneys and other members of the law enforcement 
community continue to be the main consumers of forensic services, and the forensic scientists still are in spirit. 
if no longer in law. members of that police corrununity. A Virginia statute allows defense attorneys to usc these 
services, but only four requests have been submitted in over a decade. As nearly as I have been able to 
determine, this disappointing response is due to mistrust by defense attorneys of the laboratory personnel, whom 
they consider to be employees of a police laboratory. 
Symposium Oil Science a!ld the Rules of Legal Procedure, !0! F.R.D. 599, 646 (1984) (remat!cs of Professor Andre 
Moenssens). 
101. Even if laboratory reports are generally admissible as public records, the final clause of rule 803(8) may still 
bar admissibility. That clause recognizes the trial court's authority to exclude public records if' 'the sources of information 
or other circumstances indicate lack of ITustwolu'1iness." Fw. R. Evrn. 803(8). Appiicarion of this ciause woujd directiy 
raise the issue of the reliability of laboratory reports, at least on a case-by-case basis. It is not entirely cleat, however, 
that the trustworthiness clause applies to records admitted under subdivision (B) of the rule. See 4 D. LouJSELL & C. 
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 456 (1980). 
102. See cases cited supra note 23. 
103. See lmwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Imroducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal 
Defendallls, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 621, 626-29 (1979). 
104. FED. R. EvJD. 803(6) provides: 
A memorandum, report, record, or-data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 
diagnoses, made at or neat the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept 
in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular pmctice of that business activity 
to malce the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian 
or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumst3.Tices of prepardtion 
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I. Litigation Records 
The second issue, the admissibility of records prepared in' anticipation of 
litigation, however, remains problematic. Rule 803(6) contains a trustworthiness 
clause, under which business records are excludable if "the source of information or 
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." 105 One 
factor affecting reliability is the motivation of the person who prepares the report-
whether the record was \'prepared with an eye toward litigation. " 106 The exclusion 
of "litigation records" has long been applied to police reports. For example, m 
United States v. Ware, 107 a pre-Federal Rules case, the Seventh Circuit wrote: 
[E]ven if memoranda ... are regularly prepared by law enforcement officers, they lack the 
necessary earmarks of reliability and trustworthiness. Their source and the nature and 
manner of their compilation unavoidably dictate that they are inadmissible under [the 
Federal Business Records Act]. They are also subject to objection that such utility as they 
possess relates primarily to prosecution of suspected law breakers, and only incidentally to 
the systematic conduct of the police business. 1os 
Nevertheless, the courts applying the litigation records exclusion generally have not 
extended it to laboratory reports. 109 For example, one court has stated: "We are not 
persuaded that a chemical examiner's report is made principally for the purpose of 
prosecution." 110 This view, however, has not gone unchallenged. A different court 
has written that laboratory reports "cannot be said to have been prepared for any 
reason other than their potential litigation value." 111 In this context, the "litigation 
records" rule is comparable to the police records exclusion of rule 803(8): it raises 
the same underlying issue-whether the law enforcement function of a crime 
laboratory undercuts the reliability of its reports. Here again, posing the reliability 
issue in this way ignores far more significant aspects of the problem, such as the 
expert's qualifications and the validitY, of his procedures. 
2. Relationship with Public Records Exception 
In addition to the reliability issue, the business records exception raises another 
concern-whether this exception may be used in lieu of the public records 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business·· as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
105. /d. 
106. United Stales v. Smith, 521 F.2tl957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also United Stales v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 
162-63 (10th Cir. 1986) (IRS contact card prepared for litigation). 
As Smith notes, the "litigation records" exclusion is derived from Palmer vcHoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). The 
advisory committee indicated that the trustworthiness clause was intended to codify Palmer. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) 
advisory committee note. 
107. 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957). 
108. /d. at 700. Accord United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 
451 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260, 269 (8th Cir. 1961). 
109. E.g., United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 
699 (7th Cir. 1957); In re Nelson, 83 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083-84, 374 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-86 (Farn. Ct. 1975). 
110. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 582, 45 C.M.R. 353, 356 (1972). See also United States v. 
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 228 (C.M.A. 1979). 
Ill. State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tenn. 1977). 
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exception. 112 Several courts have held Lhat documents excludable under the public 
records exception are not admissible under any other hearsay exception. For example, 
in Oates the prosecution argued that the chemist's report was admissible as a business 
record. 113 Although the Second Circuit recognized that as a general rule hearsay 
statements failing to satisfy the requirements of one exception may nonetheless be 
admissible under another exception, 114 it found that Congress' "clear legislative 
intent'' in excluding police and investigative reports in rule 803(8) precluded their 
admission under any other exception.11s 
Other courts have disagreed with Oates and have held that Congress intended to 
exclude these reports only when offered in lieu of the testimony of the declarant. 
According to these courts: "The accompanying testimony of the author minimizes 
the danger of unreliability by giving the t.--ier of fact L'ie opportunity to weigh his 
credibility and consider the circumstances surrounding preparation of the report." 116 
Under this view, if a laboratory report qualifies as a business record and the declarant 
also testifies, the report is admissible. For example, in United States v. Coleman, 117 
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the admission of DEA chemical analysis 
forms where the examining chemist testified about the controlled substance. The 
court, though, reversed, without reaching the merits, as to those counts where a 
supervising chemist testified in place of the examining chemist. 118 In this situation, 
the presence of the analyst at trial eliminates any serious hearsay or confrontation 
objection because the reliability of the laboratory results can be tested by cross-
examination. 
3. Nongovernmental Records 
In addition, laboratory reports prepared by nongovernmental agencies, such as 
private hospital records, may fall within the business records exception. 119 In this 
situation many of the issues discussed above do not arise. There is neither an overlap 
with the public records exception, nor are these records necessarily prepared with an 
eye toward litigation. Nevertheless, the reliability of the report remains an issue. The 
112. See generally 4 D. LouiSELL & C. MuELLEH, FEDERAL EVIDENCE§§ 452. 456 (1980); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, WEINS1HN'S EviDENCE ~I 803(6)[07] (1987); Annotation, Admissibility Over Hearsay Objection of Police 
Obsenmrions and J:n·csrigativt: Findings Offered by Government in Criminal Prosecll!ion .Ex.cludedfrom Public Records 
Erccption to Hearsay Rule Under Rule 803(8)(B) or (C), Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 A.L.R. FED. 168 (1982). 
113. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977). 
114. /d. 
115. /d. at 68, 72, 77. Accord United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1983) (certificate of 
fnrr:-ign government); United States v. Sim5, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377-78 (9lh Cir. i980) (FHJ repm1); United States v. Cain, 
615 F.2d 380,382 (5th Cir. 1980) (prison escape report); United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(IRS computer printouts). 
116. United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980) (Social Security fonns admitted as business records 
where the preparers testified). Accord United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1986) (recorded recollections 
ofDEA agent who testified at trial admissible under Rule 803(5)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 166 (1986); United States v. 
Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (recorded recollections of IRS agent who testified at trial admissible under 
Rule 803(5)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). See also Abdel v. United States, 670 F.2d 73, 75 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982). 
In United States v. Yalcobov, 712 F.2d 20, 25-27 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit ruled Oates inapplicable to 
records admissible under rule 803( 1 0), absent a public record. 
117. 631 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
118. /d. at 914-15. 
119. See cases cited supra note 17. 
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trustworthiness clause of rule 803(6) covers more than litigation records; the "method 
or circumstances of preparation'' 120 would encompass the scientific procedures upon 
which the laboratory report is based. The qualifications of the analyst, his methods, 
and fmdings all raise trustworthiness issues. 
D. Summary 
The admissibility of laboratory reports under the Federal Rules remains 
uncertain, principally because the issue is one of congressional intent and that intent 
as it relates to this type of report is difficult to discern. On the one hand, given the 
prior federal cases, which generally admitted such reports, and the legislative focus 
on "crime-scene" reports, it can be argued that laboratory reports should be 
admitted. On the other hand, those cases were decided ''before the recent wave of 
cases broadening the interpretation of the confrontation clause," 121 and Congress 
clearly was concerned with confrontation values when it added the police records 
exclusion to rule 803(8)(8). 122 Moreover, Congress may have assumed that labora-
tory reports were inadmissible investigative reports under rule 803(8)(C). 
Given this uncertainty, a more fruitful analysis would focus directly on the 
reliability of laboratory examinations and how their results are reported. Such an 
analysis is the key to the hearsay rule. Attempting to determine whether laboratory 
analysts are law enforcement personnel or neutral scientists, or whether laboratory 
reports are litigation records, obscures this central issue. If laboratory procedures 
present serious trustworthiness issues, those issues apply to reports prepared by 
private as well as public laboratories. 123 Moreover, the reliability issue is an essential 
aspect of a confrontation analysis and thus is cons~aered in the next section, which 
examines the sixth amendment requirements. 
ill. RIGHT OF CoNFRONTATION 
Even if laboratory reports are admissible under a hearsay exception, 124 the 
Confrontation Clause125 may require exclusion. A hearsay declarant is, in effect, a 
"witness against" the accused. Thus, a literal interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause would preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay statement, 
120. FED. R. EviD. 803(6). 
121. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 74 n.31 (2d Cir. 1977). 
122. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
123. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 80, at 837 ("If a private labomtory's report would have been 
admitted, it is not clear why the Government's laboratory report (in Oates] should not have been admitted."). 
124. For example, the Military Rules of Evidence explicitly provide for the admissibility of "forensic labomtory 
reports." Mn.. R. EviD. 803(6) (business records); MIL R. EviD. 803(8) (public records). 
125. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court 
held the right of confrontation applicable to state trials. 
For discussions of the relationship between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, see 4 D. LouiSELL & C. 
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 418 (1980); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE ~ 800[04] (1987); 
Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendmem, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557 (1988); Lilly, Notes on the 
Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207 (1984); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 
MICH. L. REv. 1185 (1979); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory ofEvidencefor Criminal 
Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978). 
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notwithstanding the applicability of a recognized hearsay exception. The Supreme 
Court has never adopted this interpretation _120 The Confrontation Clause also could 
be interpreted as requiring only the right to cross-examine in-court witnesses and not 
out-of-court declarants. Under this view, all recognized hearsay exceptions would 
satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court has also rejected this view. 127 
Instead of either of these two approaches, the Court has attempted to define an 
intermediate position, a task that has proved to be elusive. 128 In Ohio v. Roberts, 129 
the Court identified two values operating in this context: the "Framers' preference 
for face-to-face accusation," 130 and an "underlying purpose to augment accuracy in 
the factfinding process .... " 131 From these values, the Court derived a two-step 
analysis that focused on the unavailability of the declarant and the reliability of the 
hearsay statement: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his 
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ''indicia of reliability.'' m 
This summation of confrontation requirements immediately raised problems. Roberts 
involved the admissibility of a preliminary hearing transcript as former testimony, a 
hearsay exception that traditionally required a showing of unavailability. Most 
hearsay exceptions, however, do not require such a showing. 133 Accordingly, the 
applicability of the Court's two-pronged test to these exceptions would represent a 
significant expansion of confrontation requirements. As one commentator has noted, 
"Beneath [Robens'] apparently orthodox disposition ... lies an interpretation of 
possibly far-reaching significance.'' 134 
126. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("[l]f thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every 
hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme."). 
127. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court wrote: 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to 
protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the 
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as 
they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we 
have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted 
under an arguably recognized hearsay exception .... The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is 
admitted in violmion oi a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that 
confrontation rights have been denied. 
ld. at 155-56. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, 
and we decline to do so now.''). 
128. See Unired Siales v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838, 843 (l~HS) ("'This Court has recognized a partial (and somewhat 
indeterminate) overlap between the requirements of the traditional hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause."); C. 
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 749 (3d ed. 1984) ("A discussion of constitutional limitations upon the use of hearsay might well 
commence with the observation that their outline is somewhat less than clear." (footnote omitted)). 
129. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
130. !d. at 65. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. at 66. 
133. For example, Federal Rule 803 contains twenty-four exceptions where the availability of the declarant is 
immaterial. See FED. R. Evm. 803(1)--(24). 
134. See Lilly, supra note 125, at 224. Bur seeM. GRAHAM, EviDENCE: TEXT, RULES, luusmATIONS AND PROBLEMS 
290-91 n.6 (1983) ("[T]he casualness displayed in maldng the comment with respect to unavailability ... belies any 
intention to make a radical cha..TJ.ge in the law."). 
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A later case, United States v. Inadi, 135 however, supports a narrow reading of 
Roberts. Inadi addressed the admissibility of statements under the coconspirator 
exception-in particular, whether the prosecution must demonstrate the declarant's 
unavailability .136 Limiting Roberts to former testimony cases, 137 the Court wrote: 
''Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court 
statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant 
is unavailable.'' 138 Nevertheless, in a more recent case, Bourjaily v. United States, 139 
the Court again referred to the two-pronged test, albeit in qualified terms: "[T]he 
Court has, as a general matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate both the 
unavailability of the declarant and the 'indicia of reliability' surrounding the 
out-of-court declaration." 140 Like Inadi, Bourjaily involved the coconspirator 
exception, but the issue before the Court concerned the reliability of such statements 
rather than the unavailability of the declarant. Together, these cases address the 
two-pronged test: Inadi held that a showing of unavailability is not required in this 
context; Bourjaily held that coconspirator statements are reliable. Accordingly, both 
reliability and unavailability are considered in the following sections. 14 1 
A. Indicia of Reliability 
Several passages in Roberts indicate that most statements falling within the 
public and business records exceptions will have no difficulty satisfying the reliability 
requirement. In one passage, the Court stated that "certain hearsay exceptions rest 
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them 
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.'" 142 In an accom-
panying footnote, the Court cited the business and public records exceptions as 
examples. 143 In another passage, the Court noted that "[r]eliability can be inferred 
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception." 144 From a historical viewpoint, both exceptions would appear to qualify 
as "firmly rooted. " 145 Indeed, the Court adopted this historical approach in 
Bourjaily. Tracing the coconspirator exception back over a century and a half, the 
Court found the exception "firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence. "146 
135. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
136. /d. at 391. 
137. The Court wrote: 
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to questions not presented in that case, but rather as a resolution 
of the issue the Court said it was examining: "the constitutional propriety of the introduction in evidence of the 
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not produced at the defendant's subsequent state criminal trial.'' 
/d. at 392-93 (citations omitted). 
138. /d. at 394. 
139. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987). 
140. /d. at 2782 (citations omitted). 
141. The Court also mentioned the two-pronged test in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 539 (1986), which was decided 
during the same term as lnadi. 
142. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). 
143. /d. at 66 n.8. 
144. /d. at 66. 
145. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE§§ 1517-61b (business records), §§ 1630-38a (public records). 
146. BoUijaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987). For a critical assessment of the "finnly rooted" 
criteria, see Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REv. I (1987). 
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Although business and public records generally may bear adequate indicia of 
reliability, laboratory reports may not. Simply stated, not all business and public 
records are alike. The drafters of the Federal Rules recognized this by identifying 
three different categories of public records and placing different limitations on their 
admissibility. For example, although public records are generally admissible under 
rule 803(8), investigative reports are not when offered by the prosecution because "of 
the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which would result from their 
use against the accused in a criminal case.'' 147 Similarly, the inclusion of the 
trustworthiness clauses in both the public and business records exceptions supports 
the proposition that some of these records pose serious reliability risks. 
B. Reliability of Laboratory Reports 
Reliability issues involve two different but related problems-the first concerns 
the reliability of the scientific test itself; the second involves the way in which the test 
results are reported. 
1. Reliability of the Test 
There is little question that laboratory examinations may result in incorrect 
findings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the results of laboratory 
tests may be contrived,'' 148 and in one instance an FBI analyst ''reported results of 
lab tests that he did not in fact conduct." 149 Moreover, erroneous conclusions have 
been reported even with well-accepted scientific techniques. In one case, a court 
wrote: "The fingerprint expert's testimony was damning-and it was false. " 150 
Similarly, a firearms identification expert in a different case ''negligently presented 
false demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony." 151 
These examples, however, are not determinative. Many business and public 
records undoubtedly contain errors, and yet their general reliability has long been 
acknowledged. The issue is whether laboratory reports pose such a greater risk of 
error than other types of public and business records that their admission infringes 
upon confrontation guarantees. 
Unfortunately, the examples cited above cannot be dismissed as isolated 
instances. In 1978 the resuits of a Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program sponsored 
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration were reported .152 Over 200 crime 
147. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisorj commiuee note. 
148. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973). 
149. State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Me. 1979). See also State v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc. I 13, I 18,394 
N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (C.P. 1978) (Expert represented that certain laboratory tests were conducted, when "no such tests 
were ever conducted."); Annotation, Perjury or Wilfully False Testimony of Expert Witness as Basis for New Trial on 
Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence, 38 A.LR.3d 812 (1971). 
150. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982). This case is discussed in Starrs, A Miscue in 
Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concerns, 12 J. PoLICE So. & ADMIN. 287 (1984). 
151. In re Kirschke, 53 CaL App. 3d 405, 408, 125 Cal. RptT.-680, 682 (1975). For a discussion of this case as 
well as other illustrations of erroneous expert testimony, see Starrs, In the Land of Agog: An Allegory for the Expert 
Witness, 30 J. FoRENSIC So. 289 (1985). 
152. J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT & K. Ftao, CRIME LABORATORY PROAC!ENCY ThsnNG RESEARCH PRoGRAM 
(LE.A.A. Oct. 1978). 
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laboratories participated in this program, which involved such common forensic 
examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and trace evidence analyses. The Report 
concluded: "A wide range of proficiency levels among the nation's laboratories 
exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for the labora-
tories .... "153 Thus, although some laboratories performed exceptionally well, the 
performance. of others was disturbing: ''65 percent of the laboratories had 80 percent 
or more of their results fall into the acceptable category. At the other end of the 
spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less than 50 percent of their responses 
considered acceptable." 154 Similarly, certain types of examinations caused few 
problems, whereas others produced very high rates of "unacceptable proficien-
cy. " 155 Unacceptable proficiency was most often attributed to: (I) misinterpretation 
of test results due to carelessness or inexperience; (2) failure to employ adequate or 
appropriate methodology; (3} mislabeling or contamination of primary standards; and 
(4) inadequate data bases or standard spectra. 156 One of the report's authors later 
commented: ''In spite of being a fum advocate of forensic science, I must 
!53. /d. at 3. 
!54. Peterson, The Crime Lab, in THINKING Asotrr PoucE 184, 195 (C. Klockars ed. 1983) [hereinafter The Crime 
Lab.]. 
J 55. Unacceptable response rates for the various test samples were as follows: 
Test Sample Evidence Type Rate 
1 Controlled substance 7.8% 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
!8 
19 
20 
21 
Firearms 
Blood 
Glass 
Paint 
Drugs 
Firearms 
Blood 
Glass 
Paint 
Soil 
Fibers 
Physiological Fluids (A) 
(B) 
Arson 
Drugs 
Paint 
Metal 
Hair (A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
Wood 
Questioned Documents (A) 
(B) 
Firearms 
28.2% 
3.8% 
4.8% 
20.5% 
1.7% 
5.3% 
71.3% 
31.3% 
51.4% 
35.5% 
1.7% 
2.3% 
1.6% 
28.8% 
18.2% 
34.0% 
22.1% 
50.0% 
27.8% 
54.4% 
67.8% 
35.6% 
21.5% 
5.4% 
18.9% 
13.6% 
The number of laboratories responding ranged from a low of 65 to a high of 205. An unacceptable response did not 
necessarily mean an incorrect response. Other reasons for an unacceptable designation included a correct response for the 
wrong reason, an unsupported, inclusive response, multiple responses, and incomplete responses. /d. at 188-91. 
156. J. PETERSON, E. FADRJCANT & K. FIELD, supra note 152, at 258. 
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acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of laboratories are not perfonning 
routine tests competently, as shown by our proficiency testing." 157 
Perhaps as troubling as the results of this study are the reasons that may underlie 
them. In 1967 the President's Crime Commission commented that "the great 
majority of police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack 
highly s]cjlJed personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed and 
produced by the instrumentation industry.'' 158 A later commission concluded: ''Too 
many police crime laboratories have been set up on budgets that preclude the 
recruitment of qualified, professional personnel." 159 Since the time these reports 
were issued, the number of crime laboratories has increased dramatically, from about 
100 in 1968, to more than 300 in 1983 .160 Problems, however, remain. 161 In 
particular, national standards io ensure the competency of examiners have not been 
developed. As explained by Professor Peterson: 
[T]here are no minimum standards or certification requirements that must be satisfied before 
these examiners become responsible for analyzing the evidence and testifying in court. Nor 
are standard laboratory procedures available that the examiners are expected to follow when 
analyzing typical forms of evidence. 162 
]n addition, quality control procedures, such as independent proficiency testing, are 
not required by the majority of laboratories, 163 although attempts to change this 
situation have been undertalcen. 164 Other problems, such as high caseload 
157. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1984) (remarks of Professor 
Joseph Peterson). 
Problems involving proficiency testing are not limited to crime laboratories. A proficiency testing program of 
laboratories engaged in urine analyses for drug detection reached the fo11owing concJusions: "Error rates for the 13 
laboratories on samples containing barbituates, amphetamines, methadone, cocaine, codeine, and morphine ranged from 
1 I% to 94£}0, 19% to 100%,0% to 33%,0% to 100%,0% to 100%, and 5% to IOO%. respectively." Hansen, Caudill 
& Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind Swdy, 253 J. AM. MEo. A. 2382, 2382 (1985). 
]58. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISmATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967). 
159. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JusTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 304 (1974). 
160. Peterson, Ryan, Hou1den & Mihajlovic, supra note I, at 1731-33. 
161. "The newly formed laboratories and existing laboratories continued to suffer from the same old prohlems: lack 
of coordination, unqualified personnel, and the absence of uniform standards and procedures to guide the analysis and 
interpretation of evidence." Peterson, The Crime Lab, supra note 154, at 185. 
162. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642-43 (1984) (remarks by 
Professor Joseph Peterson). 
Attempts to develop national certification standards in the forensic sciences has produced mixed results. The 
following passage summarizes these efforts: 
Beginning in 1976, the forensic science field launched a major effort to establish peer-based certifying bodies 
that would review the credentials of persons in the field, administer qualifying examinations, and certify those 
qualified m practice in their chosen forensic specialty. To date, certification boards have been established in the 
areas of forensic toxicology, odontology, psychiatry, anthropology, and questioned-document examination 
(forensic pathology has had a long-standing certification board). A committee was established by crime-
laboratory examiners to develop a set of guidelines for certification. These guidelines were presented to the 
nation's crime-laboratory personnel for approval in the fom1 of a referendum. The subsequent response, 
unfortunately, was distinctly negative: the certification referendum was defeated by a 2-to-1 margin. 
Consequently, at the present time the criminalistic profession as a whole is without minimum standards 
regarding who is qualified to practice in the field. 
Peterson, Ethical Issues in the Collection, Examination, and Use of Physical Evidence, in FoRENSIC SctENCE 35, 43 (G. 
Davies ed. 1986) [hereinafter Ethical Issues]. 
163. "Crime laboratories are unique among publicly supported scientific operations in that few participate in 
external quality assurance programs." Peterson, The Crime Lab, supra note 154, at 196. 
!64. A fee-based proficiency-testing program under the auspices of rhc Forensic Science Foundation and 
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volume, 165 have also been cited. The picture that emerges is one of inconsistency, 
with some very good laboratories at one end of the spectrum and some very poor ones 
at the other end. 
Even when competent analysts use valid procedures, error may occur. The 
reason is that the conclusions drawn from many commonly employed procedures are 
based on subjective judgments, 166 with the result that disagreement among experts is 
possible. Courts excluding scientific reports have noted this problem. 167 Psychiatric 
evaluations and autopsy reports are perhaps the clearest examples. This problem, 
however, goes far beyond these illustrations. Even apparently routine and objective 
procedures involve an element of subjectivity. For example, a firearms identification 
examiner may conclude that two bullets had been fired from the same weapon.16B 
Although a positive identification is based on objective data-the striations on the 
bullet surfaces-the examiner's conclusion rests on a subjective evaluation. There 
are no objective critera used for this determination: "In general, the texts on firearms 
identification take the position that each practitioner must develop his own intuitive 
criteria of identity gained through practical experience." 169 In this sense, firearms 
identification is more of an art than a science. 170 Thus, it is not surprising that two 
Collaborative Testing Services is available. See generally Lucas, Leete & Field, An American Proficiency Testing 
Program, 27 FoRENSIC Sci. INT'L 71 (1985). Nevertheless, participation is voluntary and incomplete. "Only about 
one-third of the crime laboratories in the nation subscribe to these tests, and about one-half of the laboratories receiving 
samples actually return results." Peterson, Ethical Issues, supra note 162, at 44. The American Society of 
Crime-Laboratory Directors' accreditation program requires an independent testing program. See F.B.I., 14 CRIME 
LABORATORY DIG. 37 (April1987) (51 labs accredited since 1982). Participation, however, is voluntary and thus "crime 
laboratories that produce results of marginal quality may simply elect not to participate.'' Peterson, Ethical Issues, supra 
note 162, at 44. 
165. See Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1984) ("Unfortunately, 
errors in high-volume operations are not uncommon.") (remarks of Professor James Starrs); J. PETERSON, S. MDIAJLOVIC 
& M. GILULAND, FoRENsic EviDENCE AND THE PoucE: THE EFFEcrs OF SciENTIFIC EviDENCE oN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONs 222 
(Nat'llnstitute of Justice, Oct. 1984) ("Laboratories must guard against examining cases superficially, which is likely to 
result if incoming case volume is high and there is pressure to turn around laboratory results as quickly as possible."). 
166. As McCormick notes, identification evidence is based either on "the general experience of the criminalists or 
more exacting statistical studies." C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 652 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). Fingerprint, !rrearms 
identification, and handwriting comparisons fall into the former category. Because they are not statistically-based, they 
are necessarily somewhat subjective, at least in the sense that adequate criteria do not exist which would permit 
the expert to articulate the precise foundations for his conclusion that a "match" exists or that there is a certain 
probability of identity. Thus, one expert may feel that a positive result is established while another feels equally 
strongly that the same evidence does not warrant such a conclusion. These identifications thus depend on the 
"intuitive ability .. and ··common sense .. of the expert. 
Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 997, 1022 ( 1971) (footnote omitted). 
167. E.g., United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1292 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[B]ecause of the various means of 
evaluation and apparent subjective decisions that enter into the evaluation of gems, McClintock's confrontation of the 
preparers of the reports may have been valuable to his defense."); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 312, 322 
A.2d 653, 655 (1974) ("Frequently, the cause· of death is seriously in issue and the subject of conflicting opinion by 
qualified physicians."). 
168. E.g., United States v. Wolff, 5 M.J. 923, 926 (N.C.M.R. 1978), petition denied, 6 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1979); 
People v. Torres, 100 lll. App. 3d 931, 937, 427 N.E.2d 329, 334-35 (1981); State v. Harriman, 469 So. 2d 298, 
306-07 (La. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986); State v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 332-33, 240 S.E.2d 794, 
802-03 (.1978); State v. Benton, 413 A.2d 104, 112-13 (R.I. 1980); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 268-69 (Utah 
1985); McDaniel v. State, 632 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Wyo. 1981). 
169. Biasotti, The Principles of Evidence Evaluation as Applied to Firearms and Tool Mark Identification, 9 J. 
FoRENSIC Sci. 428, 429 (1964). See also J. PETERSON, E. FABIUCANT & K. FIELD, supra note 152, at 207 ("Ultimately, 
unless other issues are involved, it remains for the examiner to determine for himself the modicum of proof necessary to 
arrive at a definitive opinion."). 
170. Biasotti, supra note 169, at 432 ("[W]e Jack the fundamental statistical data needed to develop verifiable 
criteria .... "). 
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experts may disagree about whether there are sufficient points of identity to render a 
positive conclusion.m Fingerprint evidence raises the same problem. Because there 
is no consensus on the number of points necessary for an identification, fmgerprint 
identification is "an evaluative art." 172 Again, disagreement among experts remains 
a possibility: 
In a murder case ... state police fingerprint experts testified that a latent print lifted from 
the crime's scene was the defendant's by demonstrating 14 points of similarity. Defense was 
able to procure its own expert who proved three crucial points of dissimilarity. An acquittal 
followed .m 
Even where the scientific technique uses instrumentation, subjectivity may be a 
problem.174 
The point is not that most laboratory test results are erroenous or that 
examinations with a subjective element are unreliable. Indeed, the opposite is true. 
Rather, the point is that the risk of error is significant enough to preclude routine 
admission of test results without the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst. 175 
2. Reliability of the Report 
The laboratory report itself raises additional reliability concerns, mainly because 
of what it does not say. Typically, the report contains only the expert's conclusions. 
For instance, in a controlled substance prosecution the report may state only that the 
examined substance was "heroin." 176 Other critical information is not disclosed. 
First, the bases for the analyst's findings frequently are not revealed. ln 
particular, the laboratory report will often not indicate the specific test employed. For 
example, a gunshot residue report indicating that a person recently fired a weapon 
171. See In re Kirschke, 53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 411, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680, 684 (1975) (One firerums identification 
expert made a conclusive identification, whereas olher experts "were not able to make a positive identification .... "); 
State v. Nemelh, 182 Conn. 403, 408, 438 A.2d 120, 123 (1980) (One expert testified "that he was unable to detennine 
whelher Jhe bullets had been fired from Jhe same gun," whereas anolher "testified Jhat both bullets had been fired from 
!he same gun.");.Commonweallh v. Ellis, 373 Mass. I, 5, 364 N.E.2d 808, 812 (1977) ("The Commonwealth's lwo 
[firearms identification) experts did not fully agree."). 
172. P. GIANNELLI & E. lMWINKELRIED, SCIENI1FJC EVIDENCE 539 (1986). 
173. Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal 
Proceedings; 55 CoRNELL L. REv. 632, 638 n.38 (1970) (citation omitted). See also Osborn, Proof of Finger-Prints, 26 
J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587,588 (1936) ("[E]rrors in [fmgerprimj identification are not only possible but have been 
made."). 
174. See generally Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Interpreting Instrumental Test Results, in PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE, SCIENTIFIC .'VID EXPERT EviDENCE 409,430 (2d ed. 1981) ("No scientific function can be freed entirely from the 
Jhreat of error induced through subjectivity."). 
175. "Only a small percentage of Jhe cases in any jurisdiction go to trial, so the techrticians or scientists in the crime 
laboratories seldom are called upon to justify their procedures or conclusions under rigorous cross-examination. I think 
Jhe realization that Jheir work will not be reviewed - eilher by independent scientist or by opposing counsel and expert 
in court- decreases the care and completeness with which examiners process evidence." Symposium on Science and the 
Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 643 (1984) (remarks of Professor Joseph Peterson). 
176. United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 525 (8th Cir. 1973) (reprinting laboratory report), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 989 (1974). See also United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1982) ("[M]ost laboratory reports 
only state general conclusions .... "). 
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may be based on the paraffin test, 177 neutron activation analysis, 178 atomic 
absorption, 179 scannning electron microscopy, 180 or some other procedure. 181 Some 
of these tests are valid, while others are suspect. 182 Similarly, a laboratory report 
identifying a substance as marijuana might not specify whether this conclusion is 
based upon a visual examination, the Duquenois-Levine test, thin-layer chromatog-
raphy, or some other procedure. Many of these tests are not specific. 183 
Additional problems concerning the bases of the expert's opinion exist. Federal 
Rule 703 expands the permissible bases of expert testimony. A testifying expert may 
rely on inadmissible evidence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field.'' In short, reliance on hearsay is sanctioned. This rule has proved 
controversial as applied to the courtroom testimony of experts. 184 Nevertheless, the 
rule may be justified at trial, in part, because cross-examination is available to 
disclose to the jury any deficiency in the bases. Thus, one court has written: ''Expert 
reliance upon the output of others does not necessarily violate the confrontation 
clause where the expert is available for questioning concerning the nature and 
reasonableness of his reliance. " 185 This is not the case, however, when a laboratory 
report is admitted; there may be no indication of the bases in the report much less 
whether reliance on extrajudicial sources was reasonable. For example, in one case 
a death certificate revealed the identity of the body and the cause of death. I 86 Since 
autopsy procedures are relatively standardized, it might be assumed that these 
conclusions were based on such procedures. Later proceedings, however, revealed 
177. A number of courts have admitted evidence derived from the paraffin test. E.g., Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 771, 
778, 394 S.W.2d 135, 140 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); State v. Hoy, 199 Kan. 340, 348,430 P.2d 275, 
281 (1967); People v. Simpson, 5 Mich. App. 479, 486-87, 146 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1966); Brookins v. State, 602 P.2d 
215, 217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). 
Bw see Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388,393-94, 339 P.2d 993, 996 (1959); Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259, 270, 
402 S.W.2d 863, 869, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 942 (1966). 
178. E.g., State v. Boyer, 406 So. 2d 143, 146-48 (La. 1981); Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 176-77 (Fla. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986); State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456,459-62,216 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (1974); State 
v. Jackson, 566 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Commonwealth v. Sera, 478 Pa. 440, 449-50, 387 A.2d 
63, 68 (1978). 
179. E.g., Chatom v. State, 348 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1977); State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35, 38-40, 383 
A.2d 440, 441-42 (1978); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 326-28, 255 S.E.2d 373, 381-82 (1979); State v. McCall, 
698 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). 
180. See People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252-53, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472-73 (1978). 
181. SeeP. GIANNEW & E. iMWINKELRJED, supra note 172, § 14-9. 
182. For example, the paraffin test has been criticized for its nonspecificity. Many substances other than gunpowder 
residues contain nitrates and thus produce a positive reaction, too. One study concluded that a positive reaction is 
produced by tobacco, tobacco ash, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, leguminous plants, and urine. Turkel & Lipman, 
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 281, 282 (1955). A more 
comprehensive study found that "'rust/ colored fingernail polishes, residue from evaporated urine, soap amllap water" 
all produce a positive reaction. Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin Test," 12 J. FORENSIC Sci. 19, 23 (1967). 
183. SeeP. GIANNELLI & E. lMWINKELRIED, supra note 172, ch. 23 (drug identification); Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, 
An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973 
WIS. L. REv. 727, 728. 
184. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 703-9 (1987) ("The most controversial aspect of Rule 
703 is its second sentence .... "). 
See also Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 V AND. L. REv. 577 (1986); Carlson, Collision 
Course i11 Expert Testimo11y: Limitations 011 Affirmative Introduction of U11derlyi11g Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234 ( 1984); 
Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opi11ion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 V AND. L. 
REv. 583 (1987). 
185. Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
186. Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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that most of this information was suspect. For example, the conclusion regarding the 
cause of death-recorded as gunshot wounds-was based not on an autopsy but 
rather on the statement of a witness as tra11smitted to the coroner through the 
police. 187 
Second, even if a valid procedure is used, there is no way to determine, without 
the testimony of the analyst, if it was properly employed at the time of the 
examination. One court has noted: 
Since most laboratory reports only state general conclusions, they may be given far more 
significance in court than they rightfully deserve. Inquiry during examination of the chemist 
may reveal the possibility of laboratory error due to the carelessness of the chemist shat"ing 
a lilnited area with others and due to the large number of samples being tested. The defense 
may further wish to ask what other substances were in the sample and how these would 
affect a true test reaction. IBB 
Similarly, admission of the laboratory report may cover up gaps m the chain of 
custody. The Second Circuit's concern about the chain of custody played a role in its 
exclusion of the chemist's report in Oates. 189 
Third, information about the analyst is not reported. Only the name and position 
of the examiner usually appear. Academic degrees, years of experience, specialized 
training, and number of analyses pe1formed cannot be determined. Nor can it be 
assumed that all analysts are competent. An article on drug testing desCJibes the 
cross-examination of a drug expert with 43 years experience arid more than 2500 
court appearances as follows: 
[The expert] admitted that not only did he not have a college degree, but that he had never 
even frnished high school. He claimed that heroin was an alkaloid, which it is, but did not 
remember what an alkaloid was. He could not draw the structure of heroin or benzene, one 
of the commonest and simplest organic molecules .... ln addition, he could not explain any 
single chemical reaction about which he had testified. 19° 
In another case, an expert testified that he had a master's degree in science "whereas 
in fact he never attained a graduate degree." 191 
In sum, there is nothing "scientific" about the way test results are typically 
reported. A scientist has commented: 
For a report from a crime laboratory to be deemed competent, I thir~ most scientists vvould 
require it to contain a minimum of three elements: (a) a description of the analytical 
techniques used in the test requested by the government or other party, (b) the quantitative 
or qualitative results with any appropriate qualifications concerning the degree of certainty 
187. /d. at 346. 
188. Uniied States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847,848 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1982). See also United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 
701 (7th Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion) ("[T]he defendant at trial was helpless because he had no way to determine 
whether proper methods of analysis were used and were free from error in their execution."). 
!89. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 75 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Nothing indicates who deleted the notation, when 
it was deleted, or why it was deleted and, as it relates to the issue of chain of custody, it is a matter of some importance.""). 
See generally Giannelli, Chain of Custody and Ilze Handling of Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 527 (1983). 
190. Stein, Laessig & lndriksons, supra note 183, at 728 (footnote omitted). 
191. Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. App. 1981). See generally Starrs, Mountebanks Among 
Forensic Scientists, in 2 FORENSIC SciENCE HANDBOOK 2 (R. Saferstein ed. 1988). 
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surrounding them, and (c) an explanation of any necessary presumptions or inferences that 
were needed to reach the conclusions. 192 
Judged by this standard, most reports are not "competent." 193 Without such 
information, it is impossible to evaluate the reported findings. In effect, the report 
masks critical reliability issues. 194 Instead of a probing cross-examination of the 
expert, the jury receives an "official" report, prepared by someone with "unques-
tioned'' expertise. 
C. Unavailability of the Analyst 
The unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts presents additional difficul-
ties. While establishing the unavailability of the declarant is not a prerequisite to the 
admissibility of business and public records under the hearsay rule, 195 Roberts states 
that the Confrontation Clause "normally" requires a showing of unavailability .196 
Thus, Roberts would appear to require a laboratory analyst's testimony unless the 
prosecution could establish his actual unavailability. The issue, however, is not that 
simple because the Court recognized an exception in Roberts and substantially 
modified the unavailability requirement in lnadi. 
1. The Exception: The Utility of Cross-Examination 
The exception to the unavailability requirement cited in Roberts is found m 
footnote seven. It reads: 
A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 
U.S. 74 (1970), for example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that 
it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness. 197 
Moreover, in his Dutton concurrence, Justice Harlan cited the business and public 
records exceptions, including a case admitting laboratory reports,19B as examples of 
hearsay exceptions in which the production of the declarant would be ''of small utility 
192. Symposium 011 Scie11ce and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 632 (1983) (remarks of Professor 
Anna Harrison, Department of Chemistry, Mount Holyoke College). 
193. The reason for this paucity of information may be explained in tactical, rather than scientific, terms: "Many 
criminal defense attorneys suspect that the unusual brevity of reports by FBI fingerprint or handwriting experts (e.g., often 
one or two short sentences) may be partially explained by the fact that defense counsel is entitled to copies of them prior 
to trial." Allis, LimitatiallS on Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defe11Se Case in Federal Courts: The Shield of 
Confidenrialiry, 50S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 475 n.51 (1977). 
194. 4 D. LouiSELL & C. MuELLER, FEDERAL EviDENCE 754 (1980) ("Even reports of routine tests rest upon standards 
and are subject to risks of error which are not apparent on the face of the reports themselves."). 
195. Following the traditional view, the Federal Rules place the business and public records exceptions in rule 803, 
which does not require a showing of the declarant's unavailability. See FED. R. Evm. 803(6), (8). 
196. In an earlier case, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the Court wrote: "[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for 
purposes of the ... confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain 
his presence at trial." /d. at 724-25. In Roberts the Court reaffirmed this test, noting that "if there is a possibility, albeit 
remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their 
effectuation .... The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior 
to trial to locate and present that witness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980). 
197. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980). 
198. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958). 
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to a defendant. " 199 Nevertheless, the scope of the Roberts exception remains 
unclear:200 
Does the Court mean that a showing of unavailability is excused if the proffered 
statement is sufficiently reliable? Or is the Court commenting on the low probative value of 
the statement in Dutton? Or is it assessing the unlikelihood that defendant would have an 
interest in examining the declarant in person?2ol 
If, for example, the utility of the declarant's presence is rllinirnal because the 
statement is reliable, the two prongs of Roberts-unavrulability and reliability-are 
merged. 202 Any statement satisfying the reliability prong would automatically fall 
within the exception granted by Roberts. This reading of the exception would make 
the unavrulability requirement meaningless. 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the Roberts exception, ihe utility of 
cross-examination in this context is demonstrated by the reliability problems 
associated with scientific proof discussed earlier.2°3 At trial, the expert could be 
cross-examined on his qualifications, the validity of the procedures employed, his 
adherence to those procedures, and the methods used to safeguard the chrun of 
custody, as well as other issues. 204 The value of this type of cross-examination is not 
diminished simply because the analyst might not remember the specific examination 
in question. 205 In such a case, most of these issues can still be explored. Using the 
report and bench notes, the expert could testify about most of these issues. 
199. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970). 
200. Dutton itself left many questions unanswered. The statement at issue was made by a coconspirator and admitted 
under a state rule that went beyond the traditional hearsay exception. In ruling that admission of the statement did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause, the plurality opinion cited a number of factors. One court summarized these factors as 
follows: 
The four reliability factors discussed in Dutton ... are: ( l) whether the declaration contained assertions of past 
fact; (2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of the participants in the crime; 
(3) whether it was possible that the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) whether the 
circumstances under which the statements were made provided reason to believe that the declarant had 
misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime .... The reliability factors discussed in Dutton, 
however, are not to be considered exhaustive, nor are all factors required to be present in order to admit the 
declarations .... An additional factor, sometimes discussed and its relevance debated, is whether the testimony 
of the coconspirator was ••crucial" or "devastating." 
United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982) (citations omitted). A 
commentator has made the following observation about these factors: 
The difficulties exhibited in the Dutton opinion in articulating these tests, the uncertain relationship of one test 
to another, and the difficulties associated with applying one or all of the various tests to the facts of a given case, 
each contribute to the uncertainty existing as to the relationship of the hearsay rule to the confrontation clause. 
M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TExT, RULES, ILLUSTRATJONS AND PROBLEMS 290 (1983). 
201. J. WEINSTEIN, J. MANSFJELD, N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE, CASES AND MATEPJALS 693 (1983). 
202. /d. ("If inability at trial to demonstrate the unreliability of the statement is the crux of the Roberts footnote 
about Dutton, what is the impact of the second prong of the Roberts test - 'reliability' ... ?"). 
203. See supra notes 148-94 and accompanying text. 
204. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1977) (Defendant could have questioned the examiner 
who prepared the lab report about his "personal qualifications and experience," whether tests "were correctly 
performed," "whether the procedures and analyses used are recognized in the profession as being reliable," and 
·"whether any machines used were in good working order."). 
205. According to one writer, "cross-examination would be of limited use in shedding light on the performance of 
a routine test in a busy laboratory because of the unlikelihood that the analyst would have any independent recollection 
of the text." Alexander, supra note 52, at 728. See also In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 523, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 
(Fam. Ct. 1975) ("It is impossible for a police laboratory chemist to recall the tests he performed and their results in an 
individual narcotics case of a routine nature."). · 
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Moreover, in other contexts the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of trial confrontation of scientific proof. For example, in United States v. 
Wade206 the Court extended the right to counsel to pretrial identification procedures, 
in part, because the presence of counsel will "assure a meaningful confrontation at 
trial. ... " 207 The Court, however, went on to distinguish identification procedures 
from scientific analyses: 
The Government characterizes the lineup as a mere preparatory step in the gathering of the 
prosecution's evidence, not different-for Sixth Amendment purposes-from various other 
preparatory steps, such as systematized or scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints, 
blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like. We think there are differences which preclude 
such stages from being characterized as critical stages at which the accused has the right to 
the presence Df his counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is 
sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the 
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the 
ordinary processes of cross-examination of Government's expert witnesses. . .. 208 
Similarly, in rejecting a challenge to the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony 
of future dangerousness in capital cases, the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle209 cited the 
traditional safeguards of the adversary system, which includes cross-examination: 
"We are not persuaded ... that the fact-fmder and the adversary system will not be 
competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of [such testimony's] 
shortcomings.' ' 21° Finally, in refusing to recognize a due process right to the 
preservation of breath samples in California v. Trombetta, 211 the Court commented 
that ''as to operator error, the defendant retains the right to cross-examine the law 
enforcement officer who administered the Intoxilyzer test, and to attempt to raise 
doubts in the mind of the fact-finder whether the test was properly administered. "212 
Although these cases involved different constitutional issues, they have one thing in 
common-the Court's explicit recognition of the value of trial confrontation of expert 
testimony. 213 It would be difficult to reconcile these pronouncements with the notion 
that cross-examination of an expert would be of "small utility." 
A recent decision, Delaware v. Fensterer,214 also supports this view. In that 
206. 388 u.s. 218 (1967). 
207. /d. at 236. 
208. /d. at 227-28 (emphasis added). See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967). 
209. 463 u.s. 880 (1983). 
210. /d. at 899. 
211. 467 u.s. 479 (1984). 
212. /d. at 490. 
213. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on the 
insane violated the eight amendment. Part of Justice Marshall's opinion, which was joined by three other Justices, focused 
on the reliability of the procedures used to determine insanity - in particular, the failure to penni! cross-examination of 
the opinions of psychatric experts. He wrote: 
Cross-examination of the psychiatrists, or perhaps a Jess fonnal equivalent, would contribute markedly to the 
process of seeking truth in sanity disputes by bringing to light the bases for each expert's beliefs, the precise 
factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or caprice of the examiner, any personal bias with respect 
to the issue of capital punishment, the expert's degree of certainty about his or her own conclusions, and the 
precise meaning of ambiguous words used in the report. 
/d. at 415. 
214. 474 u.s. 15 (1985). 
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case, an FBI analyst testified that hair found at a murder scene had been forcibly 
removed. He further testified that there were three methods available to make this 
determination, but that he could not remember which method he had used to reach his 
conclusion.215 The Delaware Supreme Court held that his lack of memory precluded 
the defense from testing the basis for the opinion by cross-examination and thus 
violated the right of confrontation. 21 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court's reasoning is instructive: "[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied 
when the defense is given full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these 
infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the 
factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony. " 217 Had the 
expert's fmdings been introduced through a laboratory report, however, there would 
have been no "opportunity to probe these infn1nities." Indeed, they would have gone 
undisclosed. 
2. United States v. Inadi 
The Roberts exception is not the Court's only retreat from a strict unavailability 
requirement. As noted above, the Court in Inadi modified the unavailability 
requirement when ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator statements. The Court 
distinguished these statements from the preliminary hearing testimony at issue in 
Roberts. According to the Court, the latter is used as a substitute for trial testimony 
and thus should be permitted only when the declarant is unavailable. 
[F]ormer testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has 
independent evidentiary significance of its own, but is intended to replace live testimony. If 
the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the 
form of live ·testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the 
demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. 218 
In contrast, "[c]onspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other 
in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand.' '219 By 
the time of trial, the position of the conspirator will have changed. Facing indictment 
or trial, the conspirator will have "little incentive to aid the prosecution," and thus 
''it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the evidentiary 
significance of statements made when the conspiracy was operating in full force.' ' 220 
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a showing of unavailability is not required when 
coconspirator statements are introduced. This aspect of Inadi does not apply to the 
admissibility of laboratory reports. The circumstances do not change between the 
time the report is prepared and the time of trial; the analyst's relationship with the 
215. /d. at 17. 
216. Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. 1985). 
217. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985). On remand, the Delaware Supreme Court again held the 
expert's opinion inadmissible but on evidentiary rather than constitutional grounds. Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106 
(Del. 1986). 
218. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986). 
219. Jd. at 395. 
220. !d. 
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prosecution remains unaltered. Hence, the report is only a weaker substitute for live 
testimony. 
Another aspect of Inadi, however, is more problematic. In upholding the 
admissibility of laboratory reports in the face of a confrontation challenge, a number 
of courts have cited the defendant's failure to subpoena the analyst.221 For example, 
in State v. Spikes222 the court wrote that defense counsel "could have subpoenaed 
[the preparers of a hospital report] to testify at trial. " 223 Language in Inadi would 
appear to support the relevance of this factor. After pointing out that the defendant 
had not attempted to subpoena the coconspirator, the Court wrote: 
The Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining the testimony of 
any of these declarants. If the Government has no desire to call a co-conspirator declarant 
as a witness, and if the defense has not chosen to subpoena such a declarant, ... then it is 
difficult to see what, if anything, is gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to make 
that declarant "available. "224 
How critical this compulsory process argument is to the Court's confrontation 
analysis is difficult to evaluate. If taken to an extreme, this approach would permit 
the prosecutor to use hearsay instead of live testimony in all circumstances, justifying 
such conduct simply by citing the defense's failure to subpoena the declarant. 225 This 
would, in effect, merge the confrontation and compulsory process guarantees, 
leaving the accused with only the latter protection. The issue is not new. In an article 
examining the relationship between the Confrontation and Compulsory Process 
Clauses, Professor Westen commented: 
What distinguishes a witness "against" the accused from a witness "in his favor" is not the 
content of the witness' testimony but the identity of the party relying on his evidence. A 
person is a witness "against" the accused if he is one whose statements the prosecution 
relies upon in court in its effort to convict the accused; in order to use the statements of such 
a witness, the prosecution must take the initiative in identifying and producing him at 
triaJ.226 
He goes on· to conclude that the prosecution must call such a witness unless the 
hearsay statement ''is such that the defendant could not reasonably be expected to 
wish to examine the declarant in person .... " 227 Professor Graham has proposed a 
different analysis, which focuses on whether the hearsay statement is accusatory at 
the time it is made. "If the out-of-court statement was accusatory when made, the 
declarant is a witness against the defendant. Conversely, if the out -of-court statement 
was not accusatory, the declarant is not a witness against the defendant, and the 
" 221. E.g., United States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 250, 49 C.M.R. 380, 383 (1974); Burleson v. State, 585 
S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
222. 67 Olrio St. 2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 1122 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1131 (1982). 
223. ld. at 411, 423 N.E.2d at 1128. 
224. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397-98 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
225. "lnadi's logic should lead to the conclusion that the confrontation clause allows the prosecution to produce 
summaries of his evidence or ex parte affidavits without calling witnesses, so long as the defense can later produce those 
witnesses." Jonakait, supra note 125, at 621. 
226. Westen, supra note 125, at 604 (emphasis in original). See also Lilly, supra note 125, at 231. 
227. Westen, supra note 125, at 617-18. 
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confrontation clause has no application. " 228 Under either standard, laboratory 
examiners should be called as prosecution witnesses. Laboratory reports are 
"accusatory" when made and "relied" on by the prosecution at trial. Several courts 
have reached the same result, holding that the defendant's failure to call a prosecution 
expert as a witness is not a waiver of the right to confront him. 229 
In addition, given the inadequacy of pretrial discovery, placing the burden on the 
defendant to call the analyst would be unfair. Although some commentators have 
argued that the defendant's discovery rights provide adequate notice of the analyst's 
testimony, 230 this is simply not true. While scientific reports are generally 
discoverable,231 the report does not provide sufficient information. As discussed 
earlier, it typically reveals only the results of the analysis and nothing more. 232 
Discovery depositions are generally unavailable in criminal cases, 233 and thus the 
necessary information cannot be obtained through that device. Consequently, the 
defense may have no way of knowing what tests were used, whether the examiner 
was qualified, and so forth. Issuing a subpoena for the analyst in these circumstances 
would be a gamble, one which many defendants may forego. Thus, even if the report 
is umeliable, there may be no meaningful opportunity to contest it. 
N. CoNcLUSION 
The increased use of scientific proof in criminal trials, which has occurred in 
recent years, will undoubtedly continue. By emphasizing the importance of "ex-
trinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation " 234 and 
"modern scientific methods of crime detection, "235 the Supreme Court has encour-
aged this development. The Court's encouragement is salutary because the expanded 
use of scientific evidence will enhance the reliability of the factfinding process. 
Nevertheless, scientific proof, like other methods of proof, has its weaknesses and 
limitations. The routine admission of laboratory reports can be justified only if the 
presumption of reliability that generally attaches to business and public records also 
applies to these reports. Such a presumption is unwarranted. Accordingly, the 
analyst's conclusions should not be accepted at trial untested by cross-examination. 
There may, however, be a solution which would protect the defendant's 
constitutional rights and yet relieve the prosecution of the burden of producing the 
analyst when scientific proof is not a contested issue in the case. Several jurisdictions 
228. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution: The State of the 
Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REv. 523, 593 (1988). See also Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule and the 
Forgetful Witness, 56 Thx. L. REv. 151 (1978). 
229. See Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Gregory v. 
State, 40 Md. App. 297, 328 n.28, 391 A.2d 437, 455 n.28 (1978) ("It [is] the State's burden--not that of appellant-
to produce the witnesses against him."). 
230. Alexander, supra note 52, at 729. 
231. E.g., FED. R. CRJM. P. 16(a)(I)(D); ME. R. CRJM. P. 16(b)(B); OHio R. CruM. P. 16(B)(I)(d). 
232. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text. 
233. A majority of jurisdictions do not permit discovery depositions in criminal cases. Instead, criminal depositions 
generally are limited to preserving the testimony of a witness who may be unavailable for trial. E.g., FED. R. CRJM. P. 
15(a); Cow. R. CRJM. P. 15(a); KY. R. CRJM. P. 7.10; WYo. R. CruM. P. 17(a). 
234. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964). 
235. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957). 
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have enacted statutes that provide for the admissibility of laboratory reports if the 
defendant is served with a copy of the report and does not request the presence of the 
analyst at trial. 236 
These notice and demand statutes offer a possible answer to the constitutional 
problem. According to one court, a defendant's failure to request the analyst 
constitutes a waiver of the right to confrontation. 237 In Brookhart v. Janis,z3s 
however, the Supreme Court applied a stringent standard for waiving the right of 
confrontation, requiring the prosecution to establish "an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege. " 239 A notice and demand statute 
would satisfy this standard only if the defendant is provided with sufficient 
information to make an informed decision. This would include, in addition to a copy 
of the report, information about the procedures employed in the analysis and the 
qualifications of the examiner. The current discovery provisions are insufficient 
because this information is typically not disclosed. If this information were provided 
and the defendant were given the opportunity to depose240 or interview the analyst,24I 
a failure to request the analyst's trial testimony would satisfy the constitutional waiver 
standard. 
Moreover, this type of provision would not appear to place an undue burden on 
the prosecution. Most defendants plead guilty. In the cases that go to trial, scientific 
evidence is often not a contested issue. Once the defense is satisfied that the analysis 
was properly performed, there would be little incentive to call the analyst.242 If, 
however, the defense demands the presence of the examiner, for whatever reason, the 
sixth amendment requires the government to call him as a prosecution witness. 
236. E.g., Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 10-306(b) (Supp. 1987) (intoxication tests); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 2925.5I(B), (C) (Anderson 1987) (controlled substances). See State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App. 2d 278, 382 N.E.2d 1193 
(1978) (failure to serve copy of Jab report on defendant renders report inadmissible). 
See also IowA CoDE ANN. § 691.2 (West Supp. 1988) (lab report admissible unless defendant requests analyst to 
"testify in person"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112(1) (1983) (lab report admissible unless defendant requests 
witness' testimony). 
237. E.g., State v. Davison, 245 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); State v. 
Kramer, 231 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Iowa 1975). 
238. 384 U.S. I (1966). 
239. Id. at 4 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). In other confrontation cases, however, the 
Court has found a waiver by conduct. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (waiver of right to be present where 
defendant flees after commencement of trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (waiver of right to be present where 
defendant disrupts trial). These cases have led one commentator to suggest that a forfeiture, rather than waiver, theory 
is a more accurate description of the Court's decisions. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: 
Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRJM. L. BuLL. 99, 141 (1972). 
240. Although discovery depositions are generally not permitted in criminal cases, this proposal would not be a 
radical departure from existing practice. For example, FED. R. Evm. 706(a) provides that the deposition of 
court-appointed experts "may be taken by any party." 
241. One study suggests that this proposal would not present major problems. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE UsE 
OF SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LmGATION 38 (1983) ("The [prosecution] experts we spoke with said they were willing and 
available to meet with defense counsel and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the scientific evidence but such 
meetings rarely occurred."). 
242. A survey of crime laboratories showed that analysts, on the whole, testify infrequently. "It was reported that 
on the average, crime laboratory examiners testified in 8% of drug cases (the percentage ranged from 0 to 86%) and 10% 
of criminalistics cases (the percentage ranged from 0 to 87%) where evidence was examined." Peterson, Mihajlovic & 
Bedrosian, supra note 94, at 15. 
